My latest analysis of Celgene (CELG) is at Seeking Alpha:
Celgene Stock Price: Is It Bubbly?
Biogen Idec (BIIB) announced today it plans a Phase III trial for an Alzheimer's Disease (AD) therapy. I just recently wrote in Biogen Idec, PML Deaths, And Hemophilia Therapies that I was not counting any of its Alheimer's pipeline in my valuation, which was basically positive. And I'm still not.
The interim data on BIIB037, an anti-amyloid beta MAB (antibody), Phase 1b randomized, blinded, dose-escalated study, for early-stage AD, showed safety and the removal of beta amyloid from the brain. Also patients were tested for cognition and nerve function. Removal of amyloid corresponded with dose size and time of treatment. At 54 weeks the effects on cog were positive and statistically significant. The study is not even done yet.
Biogen is planning a Phase III trial, but that would be dependent on finishing the trial and permission from the FDA.
I hope this will turn out to be true and Alzheimer's patients will at last have a therapy that works, if administered early enough. However, I have seen false positive signals before, followed by failures in Phase II and Phase III trials. Some scientists question the correlation of amyloid deposits to mental deterioration. Cognitive trials tend to be subjective, even if double blinded.
I believe it is too early to get excited, but of course I will take a close look at the full data when it is published.
And, as I said in my article, if this therapy helps or prevents progression in Alzheimer's patients, the revenue and profits from it would likely eclipse anything we have seen in pharmaceutical history.
Disclosure: I own stock in both BIIB and CELG.
Showing posts with label analysis. Show all posts
Showing posts with label analysis. Show all posts
Tuesday, December 2, 2014
Thursday, May 23, 2013
Intel analysis
My latest article at Seeking Alpha:
Intel: Neither Bullish Nor Bearish Stories Hold Up
It mights seem a bit strange writing an article where, after a complex analysis of moving parts, my conclusion is close to neutral. But after doing my research and analysis, that was my conclusion. I spend a lot of effort trying to predict the future. That is what individual stock picks are about. In this case several variables could have gone in either positive or negative directions, so my best bet is neutral. That does not preclude the bears or bulls on Intel being right, but they certainly can't prove they are right. If they were, the stock price would be different.
Intel: Neither Bullish Nor Bearish Stories Hold Up
It mights seem a bit strange writing an article where, after a complex analysis of moving parts, my conclusion is close to neutral. But after doing my research and analysis, that was my conclusion. I spend a lot of effort trying to predict the future. That is what individual stock picks are about. In this case several variables could have gone in either positive or negative directions, so my best bet is neutral. That does not preclude the bears or bulls on Intel being right, but they certainly can't prove they are right. If they were, the stock price would be different.
Monday, May 3, 2010
Akamai Q1 Upside Surprise
Akamai (AKAM) had a kickass first quarter of 2010. Q1 is usually a down quarter for the Internet delivery acceleration company because there is a fall off advertising. Making sure that ads get delivered efficiently along with the other content of web pages is a major task for Akamai. Also many sell-side (brokerage house) analysts did not like Akamai's lowering of its prices to attract more volume in 2009.
But revenue was $240.0 million in Q1, up 1% sequentially from $238.3 million, and up 14% from $210.4 million in Q1 of 2009. Net income was $40.9 million, up 2% sequentially from $40.1 million, and up 10% from $37.1 million year-earlier. GAAP EPS (earnings per share) were $0.22, up 5% sequentially from $0.21, and up 10% from $0.20 year-earlier.
In other words, by helping its customers with lower prices, Akamai helped itself.
Although I like GAAP numbers because they are usually conservative, in Akamai's case the cash position is better than normal compared to GAAP. Cash from operations was $87.8 million, compared to net income of $40.9 million. Of course AKAM continues to invest heavily in iteslf: capital expenses in the quarter were $35.1. My guess is this is very well-deployed capital. Most of it pays for servers that are expanding Akamai's global reach. 78% of revenues are still from the U.S.
In its startup period Akamia lost money, accumulating NOLs (net offsetting losses). It has been using the NOLs these last few years to lower its tax rate. The NOLs run out this year, so its cash tax rate will go up. I'd rather make profits and pay taxes than accumulate losses.
There are a lot of companies trying to compete with Akamai, so it does not constitute a risk-free investment. So far, however, no company has come close to being able to match Akamai at Internet content delivery. While I would not describe Akamai's current stock price as cheap, it is likely to seem so later as Internet video delivery picks up steam, to Akamai's benefit.
See also my Akamai Q1 2010 analyst conference summary for April 28, 2010.
I have been a long-term Akamai investor since January 2008. My own business includes technology consulting and buy-side analysis.
See also www.akamai.com
Akamai at Wikipedia
NASDAQ Akamai summary page
But revenue was $240.0 million in Q1, up 1% sequentially from $238.3 million, and up 14% from $210.4 million in Q1 of 2009. Net income was $40.9 million, up 2% sequentially from $40.1 million, and up 10% from $37.1 million year-earlier. GAAP EPS (earnings per share) were $0.22, up 5% sequentially from $0.21, and up 10% from $0.20 year-earlier.
In other words, by helping its customers with lower prices, Akamai helped itself.
Although I like GAAP numbers because they are usually conservative, in Akamai's case the cash position is better than normal compared to GAAP. Cash from operations was $87.8 million, compared to net income of $40.9 million. Of course AKAM continues to invest heavily in iteslf: capital expenses in the quarter were $35.1. My guess is this is very well-deployed capital. Most of it pays for servers that are expanding Akamai's global reach. 78% of revenues are still from the U.S.
In its startup period Akamia lost money, accumulating NOLs (net offsetting losses). It has been using the NOLs these last few years to lower its tax rate. The NOLs run out this year, so its cash tax rate will go up. I'd rather make profits and pay taxes than accumulate losses.
There are a lot of companies trying to compete with Akamai, so it does not constitute a risk-free investment. So far, however, no company has come close to being able to match Akamai at Internet content delivery. While I would not describe Akamai's current stock price as cheap, it is likely to seem so later as Internet video delivery picks up steam, to Akamai's benefit.
See also my Akamai Q1 2010 analyst conference summary for April 28, 2010.
I have been a long-term Akamai investor since January 2008. My own business includes technology consulting and buy-side analysis.
See also www.akamai.com
Akamai at Wikipedia
NASDAQ Akamai summary page
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Friday, May 30, 2008
Marvell Reality Tops Goldman Downgrade
Earlier this week an analyst at Goldman Sachs downgraded Marvell Technologies (MRVL). The stock price dropped about 3%.
Yesterday Marvell announced its results for the quarter that ended May 3, 2008. At the analyst conference (See my summary) Marvell executives appeared very confident and had no trouble explaining why they were doing so well and expect to do well going forward. Today a bunch of firms upgraded Marvell and its stock jumped to over $17 per share.
All of this was reasonably foreseeable, as I can prove by directing you to my past articles at my main Marvell Technologies page.
Of course, reality sometimes turns the best analysis about the future wrong. Marvell has all the risks associated with the semiconductor industry.
Rather than re-analyse Marvell when my prior analysis is holding up pretty well, let's look at that Goldman Sachs downgrade. Maybe the guy was just wrong. Several analysts seemed to have bought into the idea that Marvell's position as the market share leader in the hard-drive controller chip industry is threatened by competitors. But it seems the competition is literally blowing hot air; their chips produce three times the heat as Marvell's, so only fools use them.
Sometimes a firm has advanced news of an event with market impact. Simple guys would just buy or sell on the news. But smart guys with a lot of money and political protection can issue an upgrade or downgrade, then buy or sell the stock at a better price and make even larger profits on the advanced information.
Don't think it has never happened, or won't happen again. In any case it is nice to see people who think upgrades and downgrades mean automatic profits get slaughtered once in a while.
Best to do your own analysis. And stay diversified!
See also www.marvell.com
Yesterday Marvell announced its results for the quarter that ended May 3, 2008. At the analyst conference (See my summary) Marvell executives appeared very confident and had no trouble explaining why they were doing so well and expect to do well going forward. Today a bunch of firms upgraded Marvell and its stock jumped to over $17 per share.
All of this was reasonably foreseeable, as I can prove by directing you to my past articles at my main Marvell Technologies page.
Of course, reality sometimes turns the best analysis about the future wrong. Marvell has all the risks associated with the semiconductor industry.
Rather than re-analyse Marvell when my prior analysis is holding up pretty well, let's look at that Goldman Sachs downgrade. Maybe the guy was just wrong. Several analysts seemed to have bought into the idea that Marvell's position as the market share leader in the hard-drive controller chip industry is threatened by competitors. But it seems the competition is literally blowing hot air; their chips produce three times the heat as Marvell's, so only fools use them.
Sometimes a firm has advanced news of an event with market impact. Simple guys would just buy or sell on the news. But smart guys with a lot of money and political protection can issue an upgrade or downgrade, then buy or sell the stock at a better price and make even larger profits on the advanced information.
Don't think it has never happened, or won't happen again. In any case it is nice to see people who think upgrades and downgrades mean automatic profits get slaughtered once in a while.
Best to do your own analysis. And stay diversified!
See also www.marvell.com
Labels:
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Monday, September 3, 2007
Choosing a Biotech Stock 1: Overview
September 3. Earnings reports for Q2 are mostly over except for the occasional firm with the odd fiscal year. Q3 does not end until September 30 for most companies. There will be some news, of course, and market fluctuations, of course, and maybe even some profit warnings. Basically this is a slow spell looming before me.
But I do have a project you might be interested in watching. I need to pick a new stock to invest in, and most likely it will be a biotechnology stock.
Note this is not "choose the best biotech stock for investors in general." There is no such thing as an investor in general. There are investors who have no biotech stocks and have decided to start accumulating some, including new investors who have no stocks at all. There are people whose main strategy is rotating sectors. There are people who like to spread out risk, and those who don't mind concentrating it. While my needs are very specific to my own portfolio and situation in life, I will try to illuminate factors that investors should research and consider when picking stocks, particularly biotechnology stocks, which have some peculiarities.
So first, how did I get here. Much as I would like to tell the story of how my grandpa lost his farm in a poker game and bring that on up to the present, let's just look at the current situation. I've been doing research for sophisticated investors for a few years now, and before that had a fair amount of experience in IT and other industries. I have a portfolio that currently contains only nine stocks: MCHP, RACK, MSFT, NAPS, AMD, and MRVL are in the IT camp. In the biotechnology camp I have only CELG, DNDN, and ANSV. I have some cash in my account I want to convert to stock, regardless of which direction the market takes short term. In the other hand I have some cash reserved for use only if a panick results in further bargain shopping opportunities. While I would never absolutely rule it out, I don't leverage investments with bets on stock options or even with buying on margin.
I think some biotechnology stocks are going to be worth a lot more money (better than market returns) in a few years than they are now, and may make me filthy rich if I live to see the long run. I could spread the risk out by buying a lot of different biotechs, or going to a fund. But, well, while I would recommend a fund to anyone too lazy to do their own research, the problem with spreading risk broadly is that you can't get any alpha (profits above typical market) that way.
Couple of other things. I aced Biology in high school. I worked for a biostatistics company in my youth. I spent a couple of decades writing novels and short stories, which is why I am not rich yet. Having fallen behind on biochemistry since high school, I am chewing my way through books with titles like Biochemistry
, Cell Biology
, and Molecular Biology of the Gene
. You can pick these kinds of books up, only slightly out of date, used and cheap. Beware that there are management teams out there with listed biotech stocks that are not entirely honest with investors about matters of human chemistry and statistics. Also be aware that the FDA drug approval game is something like poker: a good hand is better than a bad hand, but it still may not be a winning hand. On the other hand a not-so-great hand can win if it is the best of the lot.
I have been following a number of biotech stocks at least to the extent of listening to their quarterly analyst conferences. I am familiar with their currently marketed drugs and their pipelines. These stocks are AMGN, BIIB, DNA (Genentech), GILD, and ONXX. All of these are good companies. I also follow some biotechs for a client that specializes in bottom fishing very high risk companies; these are not for me, or anyone that can't put together and follow a very diverse portfolio.
Among the stocks I follow the two I lean towards are BIIB and GILD. I'd be fine buying either, and that would save me a lot of time. But I like doing research; it is fun; I have the time. So what am I looking for? A stock that has good appreciation potential both over a short time frame (up to two years) and a long time frame (2 to 20 years). In the long time frame the most important factors are technology and management. I the shorter time frame the single most important factor is stock price. I want something that is clearly undervalued today. That provides the kind of safety net I like.
I try to think in terms of probability spreads. For example, stock B has a 10% chance of crashing (a better drug comes out, or a unexpected safety concern arises), a 20% chance of muddling along, a 50% chance of doing well enough to make me happy, and a 20% chance of major upside. Thinking there is only one path a stock can follow is a fools way of investing. Even if you are wrong with your probabilities in a single stock, you aren't very likely to be far wrong in your overall portfolio.
Keeping all this in mind, I am going to start researching stocks. The next installment of this series will probably be an analysis of BIIB or GILD. That will provide a baseline. I'll be looking for biotech companies that could beat the baseline. I want a company that has top-quality science, looks competent to convert that into a truly beneficial drug or therapy, and yet has a reasonable price. I will show you how I weigh the prospects of a small company with nothing approved by the FDA yet to a successful company like GILD. How much risk am I willing to swallow? I'll let you know as we go along.
In the meantime you can find some help at my Biotechnology Investor Aids Page.
But I do have a project you might be interested in watching. I need to pick a new stock to invest in, and most likely it will be a biotechnology stock.
Note this is not "choose the best biotech stock for investors in general." There is no such thing as an investor in general. There are investors who have no biotech stocks and have decided to start accumulating some, including new investors who have no stocks at all. There are people whose main strategy is rotating sectors. There are people who like to spread out risk, and those who don't mind concentrating it. While my needs are very specific to my own portfolio and situation in life, I will try to illuminate factors that investors should research and consider when picking stocks, particularly biotechnology stocks, which have some peculiarities.
So first, how did I get here. Much as I would like to tell the story of how my grandpa lost his farm in a poker game and bring that on up to the present, let's just look at the current situation. I've been doing research for sophisticated investors for a few years now, and before that had a fair amount of experience in IT and other industries. I have a portfolio that currently contains only nine stocks: MCHP, RACK, MSFT, NAPS, AMD, and MRVL are in the IT camp. In the biotechnology camp I have only CELG, DNDN, and ANSV. I have some cash in my account I want to convert to stock, regardless of which direction the market takes short term. In the other hand I have some cash reserved for use only if a panick results in further bargain shopping opportunities. While I would never absolutely rule it out, I don't leverage investments with bets on stock options or even with buying on margin.
I think some biotechnology stocks are going to be worth a lot more money (better than market returns) in a few years than they are now, and may make me filthy rich if I live to see the long run. I could spread the risk out by buying a lot of different biotechs, or going to a fund. But, well, while I would recommend a fund to anyone too lazy to do their own research, the problem with spreading risk broadly is that you can't get any alpha (profits above typical market) that way.
Couple of other things. I aced Biology in high school. I worked for a biostatistics company in my youth. I spent a couple of decades writing novels and short stories, which is why I am not rich yet. Having fallen behind on biochemistry since high school, I am chewing my way through books with titles like Biochemistry
I have been following a number of biotech stocks at least to the extent of listening to their quarterly analyst conferences. I am familiar with their currently marketed drugs and their pipelines. These stocks are AMGN, BIIB, DNA (Genentech), GILD, and ONXX. All of these are good companies. I also follow some biotechs for a client that specializes in bottom fishing very high risk companies; these are not for me, or anyone that can't put together and follow a very diverse portfolio.
Among the stocks I follow the two I lean towards are BIIB and GILD. I'd be fine buying either, and that would save me a lot of time. But I like doing research; it is fun; I have the time. So what am I looking for? A stock that has good appreciation potential both over a short time frame (up to two years) and a long time frame (2 to 20 years). In the long time frame the most important factors are technology and management. I the shorter time frame the single most important factor is stock price. I want something that is clearly undervalued today. That provides the kind of safety net I like.
I try to think in terms of probability spreads. For example, stock B has a 10% chance of crashing (a better drug comes out, or a unexpected safety concern arises), a 20% chance of muddling along, a 50% chance of doing well enough to make me happy, and a 20% chance of major upside. Thinking there is only one path a stock can follow is a fools way of investing. Even if you are wrong with your probabilities in a single stock, you aren't very likely to be far wrong in your overall portfolio.
Keeping all this in mind, I am going to start researching stocks. The next installment of this series will probably be an analysis of BIIB or GILD. That will provide a baseline. I'll be looking for biotech companies that could beat the baseline. I want a company that has top-quality science, looks competent to convert that into a truly beneficial drug or therapy, and yet has a reasonable price. I will show you how I weigh the prospects of a small company with nothing approved by the FDA yet to a successful company like GILD. How much risk am I willing to swallow? I'll let you know as we go along.
In the meantime you can find some help at my Biotechnology Investor Aids Page.
Labels:
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Wednesday, July 18, 2007
Intel An Indicator for AMD?
Yesterday Intel (INTC) reported results for Q2 2007. Tomorrow rival AMD (AMD) will report results. What was only a few years ago a battle between a David and a Goliath has settled into a a long war between two giant companies (with Intel still being several times larger than AMD by any measure).
Despite the enormous progress AMD made between 2002 and 2006, becoming the clear technology leader and gradually eating into Intel's overwhelming market share, AMD investors are little better off than they were a few years ago. Long-term relationships are hard to sever; just when AMD looked like it had done the job in 2005, Intel finally was nearly ready with new microprocessor technology that had similar capacities to AMD's (and Intel fans claim its chips are superior). And let's face it: AMD got cocky too early. They bought troubled graphics maker ATI at about the same time that Intel introduced its Core Duo processors; they failed to maintain a clear lead in technology.
Intel's not very secret weapon was, and is, being ahead in fabrication technology. This is usually referred to by the scale of the lithography used, with smaller being better. Thus when Intel had 65 nm (nanometer) chips, AMD was still using 90 nm. Now that AMD is using 65 nm, Intel is ready to introduce 45 nm, which AMD won't be able to match until late in 2008. Smaller scale means more transistors (or gates) per chip.
All this meant that the inefficient processor design that Intel had evolved over two decades was able to keep roughly on par with AMD's better design (notably its on-chip memory controller). In Intel's defense it has to be said that rather than staying with the legacy designs it had planned to move to the all 64 bit Itanium processor, which is a great piece of technology that never caught on because of the enormous task of re-writing computer programs to work on it. AMD's scheme to evolve towards 64 bit processing (using chips that can run both 32-bit and 64-bit software) eventually had to be copied by Intel.
In 2006 and into 2007 profits for both companies plunged as they competed on price as well as technology. AMD has to gain market share or it will not be able to make the investments it needs to stay ahead of Intel in this race. Intel needs to defend its market share. As a result PC makers and end customers have gotten great deals on processors.
Yesterday Intel's revenues were down sequentially, but well up from its disastrous Q2 2006. It has been doing well selling pseudo quad-core server chips. AMD made the mistake of waiting until it could bring out true-quad core chips, which should happen in Q3.
The mid term future (6 months to a year) value of AMD versus Intel depends heavily on how good AMDs new chips are. As with all complex technologies, there will be room for differences of opinion. As has been the case in the past, Intel's vast advertising budget will mean that most reviewers will give Intel at least the benefit of the doubt on any issue. Also, the Intel chorus will sing "Don't buy AMD, wait until the next generation of Intel" loud and sweetly, a ploy that has worked well thus far.
You can read my detailed summary of the Intel results and analyst conference at Intel July 17, 2007.
It is generally believed that tomorrow's AMD results will a continuation of a disaster story, if possibly not quite as bad as Q1. You might want to read up on my summary of AMD's Q1 results and conference.
It is possible, given Intel's report, that AMD did better than expected in sales of low-end notebook and desktop chips. This is not necessarily a good thing. It keeps AMD market share while AMD waits to introduce new high-end products, but it may mean bad margins and lower than expected earnings (already expected to be deeply negative).
Intel did well with its quad-core server chips; that might really hurt AMD. Its dual-core Opteron servers had been the mainstay of its profitability.
Another thing to look for tomorrow is how well its graphics chip division (formerly ATI) did. NVIDIA has been kicking ATI around for a couple of years now. AMD has promised a turn around, but I doubt they were able to accomplish that in Q2.
If you don't own Intel or AMD already (I own AMD) neither stock looks like a solid bet right now. AMD's low stock price may be attractive, but as long as the processor price wars continue, it is the stockholders of Sun, HP, Lenovo and Dell that will benefit.
More data:
My Intel page
Intel Investor relations page
My AMD page
AMD Investor relations page
Despite the enormous progress AMD made between 2002 and 2006, becoming the clear technology leader and gradually eating into Intel's overwhelming market share, AMD investors are little better off than they were a few years ago. Long-term relationships are hard to sever; just when AMD looked like it had done the job in 2005, Intel finally was nearly ready with new microprocessor technology that had similar capacities to AMD's (and Intel fans claim its chips are superior). And let's face it: AMD got cocky too early. They bought troubled graphics maker ATI at about the same time that Intel introduced its Core Duo processors; they failed to maintain a clear lead in technology.
Intel's not very secret weapon was, and is, being ahead in fabrication technology. This is usually referred to by the scale of the lithography used, with smaller being better. Thus when Intel had 65 nm (nanometer) chips, AMD was still using 90 nm. Now that AMD is using 65 nm, Intel is ready to introduce 45 nm, which AMD won't be able to match until late in 2008. Smaller scale means more transistors (or gates) per chip.
All this meant that the inefficient processor design that Intel had evolved over two decades was able to keep roughly on par with AMD's better design (notably its on-chip memory controller). In Intel's defense it has to be said that rather than staying with the legacy designs it had planned to move to the all 64 bit Itanium processor, which is a great piece of technology that never caught on because of the enormous task of re-writing computer programs to work on it. AMD's scheme to evolve towards 64 bit processing (using chips that can run both 32-bit and 64-bit software) eventually had to be copied by Intel.
In 2006 and into 2007 profits for both companies plunged as they competed on price as well as technology. AMD has to gain market share or it will not be able to make the investments it needs to stay ahead of Intel in this race. Intel needs to defend its market share. As a result PC makers and end customers have gotten great deals on processors.
Yesterday Intel's revenues were down sequentially, but well up from its disastrous Q2 2006. It has been doing well selling pseudo quad-core server chips. AMD made the mistake of waiting until it could bring out true-quad core chips, which should happen in Q3.
The mid term future (6 months to a year) value of AMD versus Intel depends heavily on how good AMDs new chips are. As with all complex technologies, there will be room for differences of opinion. As has been the case in the past, Intel's vast advertising budget will mean that most reviewers will give Intel at least the benefit of the doubt on any issue. Also, the Intel chorus will sing "Don't buy AMD, wait until the next generation of Intel" loud and sweetly, a ploy that has worked well thus far.
You can read my detailed summary of the Intel results and analyst conference at Intel July 17, 2007.
It is generally believed that tomorrow's AMD results will a continuation of a disaster story, if possibly not quite as bad as Q1. You might want to read up on my summary of AMD's Q1 results and conference.
It is possible, given Intel's report, that AMD did better than expected in sales of low-end notebook and desktop chips. This is not necessarily a good thing. It keeps AMD market share while AMD waits to introduce new high-end products, but it may mean bad margins and lower than expected earnings (already expected to be deeply negative).
Intel did well with its quad-core server chips; that might really hurt AMD. Its dual-core Opteron servers had been the mainstay of its profitability.
Another thing to look for tomorrow is how well its graphics chip division (formerly ATI) did. NVIDIA has been kicking ATI around for a couple of years now. AMD has promised a turn around, but I doubt they were able to accomplish that in Q2.
If you don't own Intel or AMD already (I own AMD) neither stock looks like a solid bet right now. AMD's low stock price may be attractive, but as long as the processor price wars continue, it is the stockholders of Sun, HP, Lenovo and Dell that will benefit.
More data:
My Intel page
Intel Investor relations page
My AMD page
AMD Investor relations page
Friday, May 11, 2007
Dendreon: There and Back Again
Today you can buy Dendreon (DNDN) stock, with an FDA approvable letter for Provenge, for less than it sold for a couple of months ago when most analysts thought that an approvable letter was a very optimistic outcome; they expected outright rejection of the therapy. Why?
Dendreon stock volatility over the last 3 months is a great illustration of emotionalism, greed, fear, failing to do research, crowd pursuation, and the dangers of pricing by auction systems.
This morning when I went jogging there was a dead fox about a half-mile down the country road I live on. Unlike most road kill, its body was intact; it had died from a head wound. I had never seen a fox up close. It had a magnificent tail and fine grey fur. The mouth was open, and its teeth were terrifying even though it was dead. After some hesitation I picked it up by the tip of the tail and threw it to the side of the road, thinking of those Dendreon investors who tried to make a lot of alpha by dashing across a dangerous road at the last minute.
With hindsight we can all appear geniuses. I saw at least one blog, maybe two, that clearly, after the facts, claimed to have foresight that was not there. It is a temptation for an analyst.
Let's review the history and try not to read more likelihood for outcomes that was actually available before the dice were rolled. After all, a key component of biotechnology is understanding biostatistics, which sometimes go against ordinary, common sense.
Yesterday Dendreon's management held a conference for analysts (and open to anyone to listen to) which began to restore a feeling of rationality to the situation. If you read my summary of the conference you should pay close attention to management's statement and the Q&A portion [See summary]. What we have today is a drug therapy that is likely, but not guaranteed, to be approved as a therapy for prostate cancer, the second most common cancer in the U.S. It is how we got to this, combined with the relatively small number of shares of Dendreon stock outstanding, that led to the recent price gyrations, including the current buying opportunity.
Back in January of this year only Dendreon's management and a few brave cohorts thought there was any chance Provenge would be approved by the FDA given that the Phase III trials did not meet their pre-designated primary endpoints. They did something better: they significantly increased patient survival time. But the FDA is famous for being hard on those seeking drug approvals. So you could buy DNDN in the $4 per share range; it traded in very small volumes.
Dendreon's management said they were talking to the FDA and thought the Advisory Panel would recommend approval of Provenge. A few days before the panel's vote date, towards the end of March, the stock began to move, even though nothing had changed. Most of the stock is owned by long-term investors, and there are only 81.7 million shares outstanding.
The panel voted to recommend approval of Provenge. The stock started up. Momentum investors jumped in and the options market heated up. Those who expected a denial went short. Those who expected approval went long. Not too many people were betting on an approvable letter.
When the approvable letter came out all the short-term guys liquidated their longs and shorts. That process mostly ended this morning. So in a few short weeks the stock hit a high of $25.25 and a low of $4.95. This was driven by news that changed the probabilities of the real value of the company in the future, but exagerated by the auction system of pricing and leveraging provided by options.
Road kill? If no leverage was involved, the stupidest investor lost 80%. Sad, but it beats the returns on many Internet stocks bought in 1999.
Even with the approvable letter and the low price to future promise ration, Dendreon is a speculative, risky stock. Until Provenge is approved and is generating income, this stock should be held only as part of a portfolio created by people who have a good understanding of risks.
Please note that I have been a Dendreon investor since 2004.
See my Dendreon (DNDN) page
See Dendreon's web site
Dendreon stock volatility over the last 3 months is a great illustration of emotionalism, greed, fear, failing to do research, crowd pursuation, and the dangers of pricing by auction systems.
This morning when I went jogging there was a dead fox about a half-mile down the country road I live on. Unlike most road kill, its body was intact; it had died from a head wound. I had never seen a fox up close. It had a magnificent tail and fine grey fur. The mouth was open, and its teeth were terrifying even though it was dead. After some hesitation I picked it up by the tip of the tail and threw it to the side of the road, thinking of those Dendreon investors who tried to make a lot of alpha by dashing across a dangerous road at the last minute.
With hindsight we can all appear geniuses. I saw at least one blog, maybe two, that clearly, after the facts, claimed to have foresight that was not there. It is a temptation for an analyst.
Let's review the history and try not to read more likelihood for outcomes that was actually available before the dice were rolled. After all, a key component of biotechnology is understanding biostatistics, which sometimes go against ordinary, common sense.
Yesterday Dendreon's management held a conference for analysts (and open to anyone to listen to) which began to restore a feeling of rationality to the situation. If you read my summary of the conference you should pay close attention to management's statement and the Q&A portion [See summary]. What we have today is a drug therapy that is likely, but not guaranteed, to be approved as a therapy for prostate cancer, the second most common cancer in the U.S. It is how we got to this, combined with the relatively small number of shares of Dendreon stock outstanding, that led to the recent price gyrations, including the current buying opportunity.
Back in January of this year only Dendreon's management and a few brave cohorts thought there was any chance Provenge would be approved by the FDA given that the Phase III trials did not meet their pre-designated primary endpoints. They did something better: they significantly increased patient survival time. But the FDA is famous for being hard on those seeking drug approvals. So you could buy DNDN in the $4 per share range; it traded in very small volumes.
Dendreon's management said they were talking to the FDA and thought the Advisory Panel would recommend approval of Provenge. A few days before the panel's vote date, towards the end of March, the stock began to move, even though nothing had changed. Most of the stock is owned by long-term investors, and there are only 81.7 million shares outstanding.
The panel voted to recommend approval of Provenge. The stock started up. Momentum investors jumped in and the options market heated up. Those who expected a denial went short. Those who expected approval went long. Not too many people were betting on an approvable letter.
When the approvable letter came out all the short-term guys liquidated their longs and shorts. That process mostly ended this morning. So in a few short weeks the stock hit a high of $25.25 and a low of $4.95. This was driven by news that changed the probabilities of the real value of the company in the future, but exagerated by the auction system of pricing and leveraging provided by options.
Road kill? If no leverage was involved, the stupidest investor lost 80%. Sad, but it beats the returns on many Internet stocks bought in 1999.
Even with the approvable letter and the low price to future promise ration, Dendreon is a speculative, risky stock. Until Provenge is approved and is generating income, this stock should be held only as part of a portfolio created by people who have a good understanding of risks.
Please note that I have been a Dendreon investor since 2004.
See my Dendreon (DNDN) page
See Dendreon's web site
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Monday, April 16, 2007
Red Hat (RHT): Growing Value in Linux?
Red Hat (RHT) was the darling of investors in 2000: they paid over $150 per share for it, even though it had not shown a profit and had only a few million dollars in annual revenue. Now it is no longer even part of the Nasdaq 100 index. Is Red Hat an old dog no longer worthy of investor attention? I don't think so. Yet I would not characterize the stock, at this point, as very underpriced.
To get management's current assessment of themselves see my summary of their March 29, 2007 analyst conference.
I think many investors, and sometimes even professional analysts, fail to pay enough attention to history. Going back two or three years in a company's history, or even going back a full decade, can give some real insight into the present and future. Red Hat's past is a glorious example of how investor enthusiasm, or disregard for fundamentals, can affect a stock's price.
Today Red Hat has a market capitalization of $4.3 billion, based on a price of $22.28 per share. Full 2007 revenue was a bit over $400 million, so the stock is valued at over 10 times revenues. GAAP net income was only $20.5 million in Q4 2006. If you believe in Non-GAAP net income, you could use $32.7 million instead. Let's compromise and say 2007 net income will be in the range of $100 million. That gives an EPS of over 40 per share.
So unless you think revenues and profits are going to grow rapidly at Red Hat, you would be better off putting your money in a CD.
But revenues may grow rapidly. They were up 40% between Q4 2005 and Q4 2006. If net income grows in a similar fashion, and you are willing to pay prices now based on projections two or three years out, Red Hat's price today could be proven to be undervalued. I also like the fact that they have $1 billion in cash.
How can you inform a decision where the numbers are unclear? In this case you need to know about technology and about history.
The reason so many investors were buying Red Hat in 1998 (as venture capitalists) and in 1999 and 2000 was simple: it was billed as the new Microsoft (See my Microsoft page). Most investors, including me, regret not buying Microsoft stock when we were young. But there was a reason we did not buy Microsoft: there appeared to be better opportunities available. A whole bunch of companies in some aspect of the microcomputer business in 1983 ended up being nearly valueless by 2000. The big exceptions were Intel, Microsoft, Apple, and Compaq (which is not part of HP).
In retrospect I can be as brilliant as any analyst: I recommend that you buy Red Hat at $3 per share in July 2001. But there were good reasons RHAT did not look to be worth even that at the time. Neither past revenues nor EPS justified it. Only future growth justified it.
Whatever the technological merits of Linux, the problem with it from an investor standpoint is that it is free. If you want you can build your own Linux server package and deploy it to as many servers or clients as you have and not pay anyone a penny. Unlike Microsoft Vista or Server.
But Red Hat is making money. They are able to charge for their support services and do charge for their enterprise Linux distribution. Most companies find it cheaper to pay Red Hat or another Linux provider for their package and expertise than to try to do it "free" in-house because the cost of labor is greater in-house than when outsourced. It does not make sense for hundreds of thousands of IT people around the country to be fiddling with Linux details when one person at Red Hat can do it for them.
It is clear that Linux is a very real competitor to Microsoft. It has mostly driven all other versios of UNIX from the field except for Sun's Solaris.
So the real problem is predicting Red Hat's future growth is their competition within the Linux market. Just as Napster, RealNetworks and others fight over the scraps left from Apple's dominant music download position, a bunch of companies, small and large, fight over the Linux market.
Sun, of course, is a formidable competitor. They recently made their Solaris product free, believing they can make money on support services. Oracle is now in the Linux business; no one says they are not a formidable competitor. Both Sun and Oracle have a lot of clients to cross-sell to gain Linux market share.
So I would not place any big bets on Red Hat unless you know something the rest of us don't. I think, on the whole, it is slightly underpriced, but that assessment jumbles a lot of variables that are hard to quantify. However, if Red Hat continues to grow in 2007 as fast as it did in 2006, then the stock should move up pretty quickly.
See also my Red Hat page.
To get management's current assessment of themselves see my summary of their March 29, 2007 analyst conference.
I think many investors, and sometimes even professional analysts, fail to pay enough attention to history. Going back two or three years in a company's history, or even going back a full decade, can give some real insight into the present and future. Red Hat's past is a glorious example of how investor enthusiasm, or disregard for fundamentals, can affect a stock's price.
Today Red Hat has a market capitalization of $4.3 billion, based on a price of $22.28 per share. Full 2007 revenue was a bit over $400 million, so the stock is valued at over 10 times revenues. GAAP net income was only $20.5 million in Q4 2006. If you believe in Non-GAAP net income, you could use $32.7 million instead. Let's compromise and say 2007 net income will be in the range of $100 million. That gives an EPS of over 40 per share.
So unless you think revenues and profits are going to grow rapidly at Red Hat, you would be better off putting your money in a CD.
But revenues may grow rapidly. They were up 40% between Q4 2005 and Q4 2006. If net income grows in a similar fashion, and you are willing to pay prices now based on projections two or three years out, Red Hat's price today could be proven to be undervalued. I also like the fact that they have $1 billion in cash.
How can you inform a decision where the numbers are unclear? In this case you need to know about technology and about history.
The reason so many investors were buying Red Hat in 1998 (as venture capitalists) and in 1999 and 2000 was simple: it was billed as the new Microsoft (See my Microsoft page). Most investors, including me, regret not buying Microsoft stock when we were young. But there was a reason we did not buy Microsoft: there appeared to be better opportunities available. A whole bunch of companies in some aspect of the microcomputer business in 1983 ended up being nearly valueless by 2000. The big exceptions were Intel, Microsoft, Apple, and Compaq (which is not part of HP).
In retrospect I can be as brilliant as any analyst: I recommend that you buy Red Hat at $3 per share in July 2001. But there were good reasons RHAT did not look to be worth even that at the time. Neither past revenues nor EPS justified it. Only future growth justified it.
Whatever the technological merits of Linux, the problem with it from an investor standpoint is that it is free. If you want you can build your own Linux server package and deploy it to as many servers or clients as you have and not pay anyone a penny. Unlike Microsoft Vista or Server.
But Red Hat is making money. They are able to charge for their support services and do charge for their enterprise Linux distribution. Most companies find it cheaper to pay Red Hat or another Linux provider for their package and expertise than to try to do it "free" in-house because the cost of labor is greater in-house than when outsourced. It does not make sense for hundreds of thousands of IT people around the country to be fiddling with Linux details when one person at Red Hat can do it for them.
It is clear that Linux is a very real competitor to Microsoft. It has mostly driven all other versios of UNIX from the field except for Sun's Solaris.
So the real problem is predicting Red Hat's future growth is their competition within the Linux market. Just as Napster, RealNetworks and others fight over the scraps left from Apple's dominant music download position, a bunch of companies, small and large, fight over the Linux market.
Sun, of course, is a formidable competitor. They recently made their Solaris product free, believing they can make money on support services. Oracle is now in the Linux business; no one says they are not a formidable competitor. Both Sun and Oracle have a lot of clients to cross-sell to gain Linux market share.
So I would not place any big bets on Red Hat unless you know something the rest of us don't. I think, on the whole, it is slightly underpriced, but that assessment jumbles a lot of variables that are hard to quantify. However, if Red Hat continues to grow in 2007 as fast as it did in 2006, then the stock should move up pretty quickly.
See also my Red Hat page.
Tuesday, March 13, 2007
Applied Materials (AMAT) Slowdown
Applied Materials (AMAT) makes the equipment that makes electronic semiconductor devices (chips). In a sense they compete in the most basic industry of the modern electronics industry.
In AMAT’s last analyst conference they reported a 10% sequential decrease in quarterly revenues for the quarter ending January 28, 2007, but they were still up 23% from the quarter ending January 28, 2006. Asked to explain themselves, they said the main factor causing the sequential decline was decreased spending by display manufacturers. A seasonal slowdown in demand for chips also meant that semiconductor manufacturers were able to slow the pace of equipment purchases.
That makes sense given reports from the rest of the electronics industry. While large flat-panel displays are becoming commodity items, partly this was due to remarkable price reductions going into the holiday season of 2006. This cut into profit margins at retailers like Walmart, Best Buy and Circuit City; it also cut into the margins of the manufacturers of the displays, from high-end players like Sony to low-end players that are running full tilt trying to gain market share in this booming market. If margins are low one elective expense to cut back on is production machinery. Since demand is expanding it is not a matter of purchases of machinery going to zero. Instead excess capacity is minimized and machines are purchased only when they are really needed to meet new demand.
The same basic scenario is true of semiconductor makers. In the spring of 2006 there looked like there might be supply constraints. The people who put the chips into the boards that go in everything from cell phones to toys beefed up their inventories rather than risking being unable to meet demand in the holiday season. But then with the holiday build finished, they looked at 2007. The outlook was unclear. Even with demand good they were able to cut inventories. This meant chip manufacturer’s inventories started climbing (some more than others). So no need to purchase machines to make more chips. Again, it is not that demand went to zero. If you look at their capital budgets they kept spending; at their analyst conferences they all gave numbers for further capital spending in 2007 (which analysts use to try to predict the future for firms like Applied Materials).
A key to understanding the chip equipment makers is the transition question. Right now the leading edge is getting ready to change from the 65 nm process to the 45 nm process. But most cutting edge firms, like AMD, are still transitioning production to 65 nm. Many chips are still produced on older processes like 90 nm or larger (nm is nanometer; less nanometers mean smaller chips or more circuits on the same sized chip). Equipment makers are constantly getting ready for the next big thing, selling the cutting edge stuff, and continuing to sell the less expensive older machines. Older machines get sold off to foundries that make low-end chips.
What are the general categories of equipment that AMAT makes? Deposition processes add a thin, sometimes single-atom, layer to a substrate. Planarization makes silicon perfectly flat. Etching removes unwanted materials to create a circuit pattern. Inspection and measurement systems assure quality throughout the fabrication process. Ion implanting changes the electrical characteristics of a substrate. Thermal processes are used to change physical and electrical properties of substances and for some deposition processes. Cleaning equipment is needed to assure perfect inputs to the various other fabrication processes.
One of AMAT’s competitors is Varian Semiconductor (VSEA), which sold about $794 million in equipment in 2006. Its stock price is today over $50 per share, almost double what it was a year ago. Varian specializes in ion deposition.
AMAT sold $9.1 billion of equipment in 2006 and had profits of over $1.7 billion or $1.17 per share. Even with the Q4 sequential decrease they made $403 million in net profit.
AMAT can continue to grow as the semiconductor industry grows. With a price to earnings ratio of 15.75, or a 6.35% earnings return if you buy at today’s stock price, it is a pretty safe bet. It also yields over 1% in dividends.
With upside potential driven at base by growing demand for electronic goods in developing nations, the only downside risk in the short-to medium run for AMAT would be a global recession. Around April the consumer electronics manufacturers will need to place their bets. They will try to predict demand just right, balancing the risk of not having enough product with the risk of overestimating demand. Those decisions will be passed down the chain to chip makers and eventually to chip equipment makers like AMAT.
In AMAT’s last analyst conference they reported a 10% sequential decrease in quarterly revenues for the quarter ending January 28, 2007, but they were still up 23% from the quarter ending January 28, 2006. Asked to explain themselves, they said the main factor causing the sequential decline was decreased spending by display manufacturers. A seasonal slowdown in demand for chips also meant that semiconductor manufacturers were able to slow the pace of equipment purchases.
That makes sense given reports from the rest of the electronics industry. While large flat-panel displays are becoming commodity items, partly this was due to remarkable price reductions going into the holiday season of 2006. This cut into profit margins at retailers like Walmart, Best Buy and Circuit City; it also cut into the margins of the manufacturers of the displays, from high-end players like Sony to low-end players that are running full tilt trying to gain market share in this booming market. If margins are low one elective expense to cut back on is production machinery. Since demand is expanding it is not a matter of purchases of machinery going to zero. Instead excess capacity is minimized and machines are purchased only when they are really needed to meet new demand.
The same basic scenario is true of semiconductor makers. In the spring of 2006 there looked like there might be supply constraints. The people who put the chips into the boards that go in everything from cell phones to toys beefed up their inventories rather than risking being unable to meet demand in the holiday season. But then with the holiday build finished, they looked at 2007. The outlook was unclear. Even with demand good they were able to cut inventories. This meant chip manufacturer’s inventories started climbing (some more than others). So no need to purchase machines to make more chips. Again, it is not that demand went to zero. If you look at their capital budgets they kept spending; at their analyst conferences they all gave numbers for further capital spending in 2007 (which analysts use to try to predict the future for firms like Applied Materials).
A key to understanding the chip equipment makers is the transition question. Right now the leading edge is getting ready to change from the 65 nm process to the 45 nm process. But most cutting edge firms, like AMD, are still transitioning production to 65 nm. Many chips are still produced on older processes like 90 nm or larger (nm is nanometer; less nanometers mean smaller chips or more circuits on the same sized chip). Equipment makers are constantly getting ready for the next big thing, selling the cutting edge stuff, and continuing to sell the less expensive older machines. Older machines get sold off to foundries that make low-end chips.
What are the general categories of equipment that AMAT makes? Deposition processes add a thin, sometimes single-atom, layer to a substrate. Planarization makes silicon perfectly flat. Etching removes unwanted materials to create a circuit pattern. Inspection and measurement systems assure quality throughout the fabrication process. Ion implanting changes the electrical characteristics of a substrate. Thermal processes are used to change physical and electrical properties of substances and for some deposition processes. Cleaning equipment is needed to assure perfect inputs to the various other fabrication processes.
One of AMAT’s competitors is Varian Semiconductor (VSEA), which sold about $794 million in equipment in 2006. Its stock price is today over $50 per share, almost double what it was a year ago. Varian specializes in ion deposition.
AMAT sold $9.1 billion of equipment in 2006 and had profits of over $1.7 billion or $1.17 per share. Even with the Q4 sequential decrease they made $403 million in net profit.
AMAT can continue to grow as the semiconductor industry grows. With a price to earnings ratio of 15.75, or a 6.35% earnings return if you buy at today’s stock price, it is a pretty safe bet. It also yields over 1% in dividends.
With upside potential driven at base by growing demand for electronic goods in developing nations, the only downside risk in the short-to medium run for AMAT would be a global recession. Around April the consumer electronics manufacturers will need to place their bets. They will try to predict demand just right, balancing the risk of not having enough product with the risk of overestimating demand. Those decisions will be passed down the chain to chip makers and eventually to chip equipment makers like AMAT.
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Saturday, March 10, 2007
Altera (ALTR), FPGAs and CPLDs
At its November 6, 2006 analyst conference Altera reported revenues of $341.2 million for its 3rd quarter ending September 30th. It predicted 4th quarter revenues would decline 2 to 5%. Then when it reported Q4 revenues at $317.4 million at the February 13, 2007 conference, they were down a whopping 7%. A further decline of up to 4% in revenues was given as guidance for the first quarter of 2007. Should we panick? Is Altera sliding into oblivion? Is this 2001 all over again?
Altera makes semiconductor chips and specializes in FPGAs (Fully Programmable Gate Arrays) and CPLDs (Complex Programmable Logic Devices). All these devices can be contrasted to ASICs, which are Application Specific Integrated Circuit. Supose you have an application, perhaps processing some information inside a cell phone or a hard disk drive. You decide what the semiconductor chips have to do (what their logic structure is) in order to achieve your goals. With an ASIC you then design the layout of the logic that will be in silicon. To create the ASIC chips you go through the standard manufacturing process of using masks, doping, and etching to create batches of chips incorporating your design. FPGAs and CPLDs approach the same problem by giving engineers sets of general solutions that are arrays of possible logic states. You program the FPGA to have the same logic that you would build into an ASIC. So the end products should function identically. Why not use all FPGAs, or all ASICs? There are cost advantages to ASICs once a design is nailed down and if production is on a large scale. But when an engineer sits down to design an ASIC, she could just reach into her parts box, pull out an FPGA, and program it instead. So FPGAs go from idea to finished product much faster. If you want to fix an error, or do an upgrade, often all you have to do is reprogram the FPGA. With an ASIC you have to redesign the circuits, make new masks, etc. Speed and flexibility are what FPGAs are about, but they are also great for prototypes and specialty products with low production runs.
Because of this Altera's competitors are not just other FPGA and CPLD manufacturers; they are ASIC manufacturers as well.
While prices of all stocks fluctuate, there is no way a company like Altera, in the price range it has been in lately (52 week high $22.32, 52 week low $15.54), can be compared to the revenueless Internet stocks of yesteryear. In fact even in the relatively lousy 4th quarter Altera had net income of $99 million, up 43% from its Q4 of 2005. It is in a competitive business, but not that many companies are competing in programmable silicon, so profit margins are healthy.
Altera constantly invests in the future: its R&D runs about $60 to $65 million per quarter. Part of the recent revenue decline is due to customers reducing inventory, getting into cautious positions for 2007 sales. 39% of revenue was in sales to the communications industry, which continues to deploy not just new models of cell phones, but whole new types of products like WiMax and 3G phones and their attendant base stations.
Who competes head-to-head with Altera? Actel, Atmel, Lattice Semiconductor, NEC, Quicklogic, and Xilinx. Actel had $48.2 million in Q4 2006 revenues and has FPGAs as its principal products. Atmel primarily makes microcontrollers, though it does have several FPGA lines; it has been struggling the last few years. Lattice Semiconductor is focused on FPGAs and had revenues of $61.8 million in Q4 2006. NEC is a huge company which derives only a small amount of revenue from FPGAs. Quicklogic’s web site is worth a look: they openly and cleverly challenge Altera and Xilinx on their home page. Their Q4 revenue was $7.7 million, plunging 25% year-over-year. And then there is Xilinx, the main competition. You can find out more about XLNX in my analyst conference summary for this company, which claimed 70% of the global FPGA market in 2006.
The only real short-term threat to Altera’s profitability is a global recession. In the long run their competitors are a threat, but Altera also has the potential to eat into Xilinx's market share. Overall PLD (programmable logic device) usage is certain to grow.
Altera makes semiconductor chips and specializes in FPGAs (Fully Programmable Gate Arrays) and CPLDs (Complex Programmable Logic Devices). All these devices can be contrasted to ASICs, which are Application Specific Integrated Circuit. Supose you have an application, perhaps processing some information inside a cell phone or a hard disk drive. You decide what the semiconductor chips have to do (what their logic structure is) in order to achieve your goals. With an ASIC you then design the layout of the logic that will be in silicon. To create the ASIC chips you go through the standard manufacturing process of using masks, doping, and etching to create batches of chips incorporating your design. FPGAs and CPLDs approach the same problem by giving engineers sets of general solutions that are arrays of possible logic states. You program the FPGA to have the same logic that you would build into an ASIC. So the end products should function identically. Why not use all FPGAs, or all ASICs? There are cost advantages to ASICs once a design is nailed down and if production is on a large scale. But when an engineer sits down to design an ASIC, she could just reach into her parts box, pull out an FPGA, and program it instead. So FPGAs go from idea to finished product much faster. If you want to fix an error, or do an upgrade, often all you have to do is reprogram the FPGA. With an ASIC you have to redesign the circuits, make new masks, etc. Speed and flexibility are what FPGAs are about, but they are also great for prototypes and specialty products with low production runs.
Because of this Altera's competitors are not just other FPGA and CPLD manufacturers; they are ASIC manufacturers as well.
While prices of all stocks fluctuate, there is no way a company like Altera, in the price range it has been in lately (52 week high $22.32, 52 week low $15.54), can be compared to the revenueless Internet stocks of yesteryear. In fact even in the relatively lousy 4th quarter Altera had net income of $99 million, up 43% from its Q4 of 2005. It is in a competitive business, but not that many companies are competing in programmable silicon, so profit margins are healthy.
Altera constantly invests in the future: its R&D runs about $60 to $65 million per quarter. Part of the recent revenue decline is due to customers reducing inventory, getting into cautious positions for 2007 sales. 39% of revenue was in sales to the communications industry, which continues to deploy not just new models of cell phones, but whole new types of products like WiMax and 3G phones and their attendant base stations.
Who competes head-to-head with Altera? Actel, Atmel, Lattice Semiconductor, NEC, Quicklogic, and Xilinx. Actel had $48.2 million in Q4 2006 revenues and has FPGAs as its principal products. Atmel primarily makes microcontrollers, though it does have several FPGA lines; it has been struggling the last few years. Lattice Semiconductor is focused on FPGAs and had revenues of $61.8 million in Q4 2006. NEC is a huge company which derives only a small amount of revenue from FPGAs. Quicklogic’s web site is worth a look: they openly and cleverly challenge Altera and Xilinx on their home page. Their Q4 revenue was $7.7 million, plunging 25% year-over-year. And then there is Xilinx, the main competition. You can find out more about XLNX in my analyst conference summary for this company, which claimed 70% of the global FPGA market in 2006.
The only real short-term threat to Altera’s profitability is a global recession. In the long run their competitors are a threat, but Altera also has the potential to eat into Xilinx's market share. Overall PLD (programmable logic device) usage is certain to grow.
Monday, March 5, 2007
Fighting the Stock Market: 2001 Over Again?
I became a technology stock research analyst by accident. I was talking to a big-time investor back in 2000. I made indexes for technology books back then; one of my clients was Microsoft Press. He wanted to invest tens of millions of dollars in Linux startups. I told him I did not think it was a good idea. The Linux startups (see Red Hat) were already priced as if they had defeated Microsoft in the field of battle, yet they had made no profits and had little to show in sales. I explained that Linux was not ready for prime time, and more to the point, it was free. How much money could be made on a free product? I said that most of the switching to Linux would come from UNIX sellers, which meant that IBM and Sun would be hurt far worse than Microsoft.
I owned no stocks in 1999. Today I own Microsoft but not Red Hat. But today is not 2000. If someone want's to buy Red Hat today, and was a client, I would make up a report of the downside and the upside. Today Red Hat has substantial sales, makes a profit, and has a Price to Earnings ratio that is steep but not much out of line with its growing prospects. It has diversified around Linux. It has a bunch of competitors, including Novell (NOVL). On the other hand Sun, while it is not out of the woods yet, at least has a realistic stock price. It had substantial profits in 1999, but its stock price was still more than an order of magnitude higher than what its actual numbers could support.
Military historians often attribute the loss of battles and wars to generals who were still stuck in the tactics or strategies of the past. Remember the investors who failed to panick early enough in 2000-2001? Or rather, they should have analysed the companies in their portfolio, rather than buying into a bunch of bull and having to time their panick.
Now some people are acting as if it is 2001 and dumping tech stocks due to the China panick of last week. Take a good look at some of the stocks they are selling. They are profitable and have attractive PE ratios. They are still growing. Their main sources of growth are often Asian markets that are growing strong. Yes, a recession in the US would hurt their earnings. No, none of them looks like the next Microsoft. But they are worth something. And if there is no recession this year, they are going to be worth substatially more than people think today when 2007 is over.
Look at the numbers. Take into account what management has to say by reading my summaries of analyst conferences. Diversify; prefer substance to rhetoric. You'll beat not just the small investors who don't do their homework, but plenty of the professionals as well.
I owned no stocks in 1999. Today I own Microsoft but not Red Hat. But today is not 2000. If someone want's to buy Red Hat today, and was a client, I would make up a report of the downside and the upside. Today Red Hat has substantial sales, makes a profit, and has a Price to Earnings ratio that is steep but not much out of line with its growing prospects. It has diversified around Linux. It has a bunch of competitors, including Novell (NOVL). On the other hand Sun, while it is not out of the woods yet, at least has a realistic stock price. It had substantial profits in 1999, but its stock price was still more than an order of magnitude higher than what its actual numbers could support.
Military historians often attribute the loss of battles and wars to generals who were still stuck in the tactics or strategies of the past. Remember the investors who failed to panick early enough in 2000-2001? Or rather, they should have analysed the companies in their portfolio, rather than buying into a bunch of bull and having to time their panick.
Now some people are acting as if it is 2001 and dumping tech stocks due to the China panick of last week. Take a good look at some of the stocks they are selling. They are profitable and have attractive PE ratios. They are still growing. Their main sources of growth are often Asian markets that are growing strong. Yes, a recession in the US would hurt their earnings. No, none of them looks like the next Microsoft. But they are worth something. And if there is no recession this year, they are going to be worth substatially more than people think today when 2007 is over.
Look at the numbers. Take into account what management has to say by reading my summaries of analyst conferences. Diversify; prefer substance to rhetoric. You'll beat not just the small investors who don't do their homework, but plenty of the professionals as well.
Monday, February 12, 2007
Understanding Akamai
After the Akamai analyst conference the other day I was pretty enthusiastic and thought I might buy a bit of Akamai (AKAM) stock. The price shot up in after hours trading after the conference, so others were thinking the same thing. Friday the stock dropped 5%, not because of any fundamental change but because the hot money crowd that bought on Thursday found themselves in a generally down tech market.
I realized I did not really understand what Akamai did. Speed up the Internet for their customers, sure, but how?
Apparently Akamai realized that while the Internet is supposed to function automatically, in reality that functionality is not always very efficiently. Simplifying somewhat, when you enter a URL in your browser, say www.YouTube.com, the browser sends out a request for information from the URL. Out in the internet a "name server" translates the YouTube into a number, the IP (Internet Protocol) number of YouTube, and the first router (more than likely made by Cisco) uses its map of the Internet to either (1) forward the request to another router or (2) if it is connected to YouTube, actually forward the request to the YouTube server farm. There the request is processed and sent back to the originating address, again through at least one but usually many routers.
The existence of many routers means there are usually multiple paths between end points. Some paths have more routers in them than others, and routers produce delays, usually very slight ones. But an overloaded router can be a problem.
Akamai has an array of servers that monitor the state of Internet traffic. They use that information to do two things for their customers. One is that they are able to optimize routes - choose the fastest routes for their customers. The fastest route may shift from second to second or on any other time scales. The other is they allow content to be held near the end points that are frequently requesting it. Thus if a particular YouTube video is being watched by large numbers of people on a given day, instead of going to the YouTube servers every time a request is made, the request can be answered from a cache that is time-wise closer to the end user. Akamai claims to handle 20% of Internet traffic.
Akamai's servers, in addition to monitoring Web traffic, can hold its customers content and server it up in an efficient manner.
This is important to Akamai's customers because there is little point to serving up content if the end consumers have gotten bored and clicked onto something new while waiting for all those routers to get their act in gear.
It is a great company with good ideas. But I have decided not to buy the shares. Why? By my criteria (but obviously not by some other investors) the price of the stock is too high. I think of it in terms of market capitalization, which for AKAM ended today near $8.6 billion. The company is predicting that revenues for 2007 would total $610 to $625 million, with adjusted (non-GAAP) net income around $200 million. Now that is a great model, getting almost 1/3 profit out of your revenues. But the high market cap to sales and market cap to profits ratios are too rich for my portfolio, given other choices available. I have seen too many companies on upward trajectories level off their growth rates to draw a straight line several years out assuming these ratios will remain this high. Three years of continued high growth could prove me wrong.
I realized I did not really understand what Akamai did. Speed up the Internet for their customers, sure, but how?
Apparently Akamai realized that while the Internet is supposed to function automatically, in reality that functionality is not always very efficiently. Simplifying somewhat, when you enter a URL in your browser, say www.YouTube.com, the browser sends out a request for information from the URL. Out in the internet a "name server" translates the YouTube into a number, the IP (Internet Protocol) number of YouTube, and the first router (more than likely made by Cisco) uses its map of the Internet to either (1) forward the request to another router or (2) if it is connected to YouTube, actually forward the request to the YouTube server farm. There the request is processed and sent back to the originating address, again through at least one but usually many routers.
The existence of many routers means there are usually multiple paths between end points. Some paths have more routers in them than others, and routers produce delays, usually very slight ones. But an overloaded router can be a problem.
Akamai has an array of servers that monitor the state of Internet traffic. They use that information to do two things for their customers. One is that they are able to optimize routes - choose the fastest routes for their customers. The fastest route may shift from second to second or on any other time scales. The other is they allow content to be held near the end points that are frequently requesting it. Thus if a particular YouTube video is being watched by large numbers of people on a given day, instead of going to the YouTube servers every time a request is made, the request can be answered from a cache that is time-wise closer to the end user. Akamai claims to handle 20% of Internet traffic.
Akamai's servers, in addition to monitoring Web traffic, can hold its customers content and server it up in an efficient manner.
This is important to Akamai's customers because there is little point to serving up content if the end consumers have gotten bored and clicked onto something new while waiting for all those routers to get their act in gear.
It is a great company with good ideas. But I have decided not to buy the shares. Why? By my criteria (but obviously not by some other investors) the price of the stock is too high. I think of it in terms of market capitalization, which for AKAM ended today near $8.6 billion. The company is predicting that revenues for 2007 would total $610 to $625 million, with adjusted (non-GAAP) net income around $200 million. Now that is a great model, getting almost 1/3 profit out of your revenues. But the high market cap to sales and market cap to profits ratios are too rich for my portfolio, given other choices available. I have seen too many companies on upward trajectories level off their growth rates to draw a straight line several years out assuming these ratios will remain this high. Three years of continued high growth could prove me wrong.
Thursday, January 4, 2007
AMD and the Analysts
AMD's stock price fell yesterday to $19.52 per share after a Goldman Sachs analyst downgraded the stock to Sell. Reasons given were "concerns about higher spending, a weak price environment for PC chips, and increased competition from its larger rival Intel." [Dow Jones Business News]
I own AMD stock. I bought it on 8/3/2004 at $11.86 per share. So although I am trying to be objective here, take that into account and think for yourself about what I have to say.
According to the NASDAQ web site, in the past 52 weeks the stock has traded as high as 42.70 and as low as 16.90. It currently has a PE (price/earnings) ratio of 18.85, and a forward PE ratio of 12.30. Normally a rapidly growing technology company like AMD would have a PE ratio well above 30. Which is to say, investors are discounting both AMDs past performance and the trend towards increasing earnings.
There is a big reason: AMD is in an economic and technological war with Intel, which only a few years ago owned the global microprocessor market, allowing AMD less than a 10% market share.
But all technology companies are in fierce competition. Apple is still in fierce competition with Microsoft, but it is growing and has a PE ratio today of 37.74. Intel itself today had a PE ratio of 21.2 (with a forward PE ratio of 14.9).
Like so many companies, you cannot just look at AMD aggregate data like annual or quarterly revenues. AMD spun off its Spansion memory-chip division and acquired graphic chip maker ATI in 2006. ATI revenues have not been consolidated in, but Spansion revenues have come out. For the core (mainly processor chip) business, Q3 2006 revenues were $1.3 billion, up 32% from the year earlier quarter. Net income was $134 million, up 50% from a year earlier.
Again, normally number like that would command a high PE ratio. And that is despite everything Intel could throw at AMD, including liquidating much of its antiquated chip inventory, which did drive pricing down.
Sell side analysts work for brokers that make their money when you buy and sell a stock. Without discounting that bias, in 2006 a Citibank analyst downgraded AMD stock early in the year, then upgraded it later in the year. The same reasons were given for the downgrade: low prices (called ASPs, actual sales prices, to distinguish from list prices) from the war with Intel. The upgrade was because AMD stock did fall, but then AMD had okay if degraded revenue and income anyway.
Why did Goldman Sachs wait to downgrade the stock until yesterday when AMDs aggressive spending plans and acquisition of ATI have been open for all to see for a year? I think it is because AMD stock climbed substantially after the December, 14, 2006 Analysts Day presentation (see my notes).
Recent testing shows that AMDs processors remain superior to Intel's, largely due to Intel's poor memory management. Most tech guys expect AMD processors to improve greatly this year as it produces chips with the 60 nm process. Intel already switched to 60 nm, but its inefficient chip design ate up the benefits of that more.
AMD is thinking long term. That is why they bought ATI, are finishing up their new plant in Germany, have a good fabless capacity, and have an option on building a new fab in New York State. I am sure Intel thinks long term too, and they aren't nearly as arrogant as they were 3 years ago.
If Goldman Sachs is right AMD had a poor 4th quarter compared to Intel. The new Duo chips from Intel were supported by a massive marketing campaign. Lots of tech buyers own Intel stock, and I know that influences decisions (of the 4 working computers I own, 3 are Intel based, only the newest has an AMD chip). ATI had some problems that will need to be worked out in 2007.
But lots of the smartest tech guys, especially the ones who have to run big server farms, have shifted over to AMD in the past 3 years. As long as AMD continues to build superior processors, the shift will continue. The only power Intel has is to determine the level of profits at both companies.
There are no guarantees. AMD may make a mistake. But it looks to me like AMD has the better processors and the better road plan. I think the most likely path is that AMD will continue to chew at the Intel dinosaur until it is dead. If that happens I hope AMD won't grow as arrogant as Intel did.
More on AMD
More on Intel
I own AMD stock. I bought it on 8/3/2004 at $11.86 per share. So although I am trying to be objective here, take that into account and think for yourself about what I have to say.
According to the NASDAQ web site, in the past 52 weeks the stock has traded as high as 42.70 and as low as 16.90. It currently has a PE (price/earnings) ratio of 18.85, and a forward PE ratio of 12.30. Normally a rapidly growing technology company like AMD would have a PE ratio well above 30. Which is to say, investors are discounting both AMDs past performance and the trend towards increasing earnings.
There is a big reason: AMD is in an economic and technological war with Intel, which only a few years ago owned the global microprocessor market, allowing AMD less than a 10% market share.
But all technology companies are in fierce competition. Apple is still in fierce competition with Microsoft, but it is growing and has a PE ratio today of 37.74. Intel itself today had a PE ratio of 21.2 (with a forward PE ratio of 14.9).
Like so many companies, you cannot just look at AMD aggregate data like annual or quarterly revenues. AMD spun off its Spansion memory-chip division and acquired graphic chip maker ATI in 2006. ATI revenues have not been consolidated in, but Spansion revenues have come out. For the core (mainly processor chip) business, Q3 2006 revenues were $1.3 billion, up 32% from the year earlier quarter. Net income was $134 million, up 50% from a year earlier.
Again, normally number like that would command a high PE ratio. And that is despite everything Intel could throw at AMD, including liquidating much of its antiquated chip inventory, which did drive pricing down.
Sell side analysts work for brokers that make their money when you buy and sell a stock. Without discounting that bias, in 2006 a Citibank analyst downgraded AMD stock early in the year, then upgraded it later in the year. The same reasons were given for the downgrade: low prices (called ASPs, actual sales prices, to distinguish from list prices) from the war with Intel. The upgrade was because AMD stock did fall, but then AMD had okay if degraded revenue and income anyway.
Why did Goldman Sachs wait to downgrade the stock until yesterday when AMDs aggressive spending plans and acquisition of ATI have been open for all to see for a year? I think it is because AMD stock climbed substantially after the December, 14, 2006 Analysts Day presentation (see my notes).
Recent testing shows that AMDs processors remain superior to Intel's, largely due to Intel's poor memory management. Most tech guys expect AMD processors to improve greatly this year as it produces chips with the 60 nm process. Intel already switched to 60 nm, but its inefficient chip design ate up the benefits of that more.
AMD is thinking long term. That is why they bought ATI, are finishing up their new plant in Germany, have a good fabless capacity, and have an option on building a new fab in New York State. I am sure Intel thinks long term too, and they aren't nearly as arrogant as they were 3 years ago.
If Goldman Sachs is right AMD had a poor 4th quarter compared to Intel. The new Duo chips from Intel were supported by a massive marketing campaign. Lots of tech buyers own Intel stock, and I know that influences decisions (of the 4 working computers I own, 3 are Intel based, only the newest has an AMD chip). ATI had some problems that will need to be worked out in 2007.
But lots of the smartest tech guys, especially the ones who have to run big server farms, have shifted over to AMD in the past 3 years. As long as AMD continues to build superior processors, the shift will continue. The only power Intel has is to determine the level of profits at both companies.
There are no guarantees. AMD may make a mistake. But it looks to me like AMD has the better processors and the better road plan. I think the most likely path is that AMD will continue to chew at the Intel dinosaur until it is dead. If that happens I hope AMD won't grow as arrogant as Intel did.
More on AMD
More on Intel
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